Iceland's EU referendum: "No" is a vote for freedom
Icelanders usually know better than foreign bureaucrats what is in their own interest
Hannes Holmsteinn Gissurarson is a Professor Emeritus of Politics at the University of Iceland
On 29 August 2026, Iceland holds a referendum on whether to renew its 2009 application for membership of the European Union, which was put on hold in 2013. Iceland is already deeply integrated into Europe through its membership of the European Economic Area (EEA) with Norway, Liechtenstein, and, for all practical purposes, Switzerland, since 1994. Through the EEA, it enjoys access to the Single Market while retaining control of its fisheries, agriculture, foreign trade, and monetary affairs. Supporters of membership argue, however, that Iceland should join the EU to exert influence over the rules of the Single Market. Opponents counter that this influence would be negligible: 0.8 per cent of the members of Parliament; 0.1 per cent of the vote on most issues in the European Council; one out of 28 commissioners and one out of 28 judges in the Court of Justice of the European Union, both of whom are supposed not to serve the interests of their home country.
To achieve this negligible influence, Iceland would have to transfer control of its fisheries, agriculture, foreign trade, and monetary affairs to Brussels, as the No Camp points out. Icelandic fisheries are both sustainable and profitable, thanks to a system of individual transferable quotas, whereas the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy has largely failed. Icelandic agriculture produces half the food consumed in Iceland, protected by tariffs, while the other half is imported, mostly without tariffs. In Iceland’s harsh, semi-arctic climate, agriculture (and with it, food security) would hardly survive without this protection. Because Iceland is not an EU member, it has been able to make free trade agreements with China and other countries. Maintaining its own currency, the króna, has given Iceland much more flexibility than it would have if it adopted the euro.
Moreover, as a prosperous country, Iceland would contribute far more to the EU than it would receive. Indeed, an EU official told the Brussels magazine Politico that it would be opportune for the EU if Iceland and Montenegro joined at the same time, so Iceland’s net contribution could cover Montenegro’s net cost!
But the EU covets Iceland not only for its fertile fishing grounds and its contribution to its coffers, but also because oil-rich Norway might follow Iceland into the EU. Also, those in Brussels who dream of a powerful United States of Europe as a rival to the United States of America would welcome Iceland, which has, since 1951, had a defence treaty with the US, under which the US undertakes to defend this strategically located North Atlantic island. They would like to see Iceland’s ties to the US weaken.
Supporters of membership present the EU as a bastion of freedom and democracy. Opponents observe that the EU has been gradually shifting from a customs union, guided by the four freedoms of goods, services, labour, and capital, towards a centralised federal state (indeed, the ultimate goal of some of its founders). They point out that its two main centralising forces, the European Commission in Brussels and the Court of Justice of the EU in Luxembourg, are non-transparent and unaccountable. With a steady flow of sometimes inconsistent directives and regulations, the EU is stifling innovation and restricting freedom of expression.
With Great Britain’s departure, the EU lost the European country with the longest tradition of liberty under the law. The No Camp also cites Iceland’s history. Settled from Norway between 874 and 930, Iceland maintained a Commonwealth from 930 to 1262, during which, as a German chronicler noted in the eleventh century, there was no king but the law. When the Norwegian king sent an emissary in 1024 to persuade the Icelanders to pledge allegiance to him, a farmer, Einar from Thverá, delivered a memorable speech at Iceland’s popular assembly. He said he could well believe the king was a good one, but experience showed that kings turned out differently—some well, others badly—and that therefore it was best to have no king. The Icelanders should be friends of the king, not his subjects.
The bad experience of foreign rule from 1262 to 1918 suggests that the Icelanders usually know better than foreign bureaucrats what is in their own interest.